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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO AWARD MARGEE FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF THE VALUE
OF THE PARTIES' MARITAL PROPERTY AND THE
APPRECIATED VALUE OF DUNE ROAD AND THE DUNE ROAD
RENTAL ACCOUNT.
The district court misunderstood or misapplied the law by failing to
award Margee her presumed fifty percent (50%) share of the value of
the parties' marital property.

As mandated by our case law as cited in our opening brief, the trial court properly
categorized the Marital Home and its by-products, the $263,000 Account and Kate Road,
together with the Park City Condo, as marital property. Having reached that point, it appears
from the trial court's expressed guiding principles of law, that the trial court was aware that
each of the parties was presumptively entitled to 50% of that marital property. (Add. B, f
1 .b.). However, nowhere in the record is there any indication that the trial court understood
that such presumption could only be ignored if there were "exceptional circumstances" that
the trial court had to articulate. Instead, the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law
by incorrectly following another of the trial court's guiding principles expressed as follows:
Property acquired during the marriage with proceeds from
separate property is usually considered pre-marital and not
marital. (Add. B, If I.e.).
It is the unjustified application of that last cited principle that makes the trial court's
ultimate ignoring of Margee's 50% entitlement reversible. The whole dynamics of the case
changed once the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the Park City Condo
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were found and concluded to have been martial properties.1 In spite of that correct
determination, opposing counsel, as did the trial court, continues to treat a substantial portion
of those assets as separate, pre-marital properties. Such is apparent from the following
references to Appellee's Brief:
1.

At paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts, without any citation, opposing

counsel states:
The parties agreed, prior to their marriage, that Chuck Hayes
would continue his primary residential development business
and, in doing so, this would provide a home for the parties.
What the trial court really found is as follows:
Just prior to their marriage, the parties agreed that after their
marriage Chuck would continue with his real estate development
business and provide a home for the family, and that Margee
would continue to work as a flight attendant and provide steady
income and valuable employment benefits for their family.
(Add. A, t 36).
There is an obvious dramatic difference in the two versions of the parties' agreement.
2.

At paragraph 11 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel states "Similar to

all his prior real estate projects, the Aerie home was titled in Chuck's name" thus implying
that the Marital Home was not marital property. Such implication is directly contrary to the

1

The reason why we have not found it necessary to quarrel with the trial court's finding
that Chuck's forgery of Margee's signature on the $300,000 Line of Credit secured by the
Marital Home and Chuck's deeding of the Marital Home to her was innocuous, is because
the trial court found and concluded that the Marital Home was marital property. Had the trial
court found and concluded that the Marital Home was not marital property, then it would
have been crucial for Margee to argue the effect of Chuck's forgeries and deeding of the
Martial Home to Margee. That became unnecessary upon the trial court's determination that
the Marital Home was marital property.
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trial court's findings and conclusions that the Marital Home was marital property. (App. A,
1f 67; App. B, | 17; App. C, p. 17; App. D, pp. 470, 473, 474).
3.

At paragraph 13 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel states:
The Court found . . . that it was fair and reasonable that both
parties be awarded their pre-marital properties and contributions.
(Citations omitted).

The way the paragraph is written, it implies that the pre-marital properties and contributions
at issue never became marital property, but the record makes clear that the properties at issue
were marital properties. See paragraph 2 above.
4.

At paragraph 20 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel states in the

introduction to such paragraph that:
As of the date of trial, but before recognition of each parties'
separate contributions, the Court found that the following items
were subject to distribution by the Court: . . . .
Note how opposing counsel has avoided characterizing the "following items" as marital
properties, which they were.
5.

At paragraph 25 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel again avoids

identifying the property at issue as marital property, calling it only "properly subject to
distribution."
6.

At section I of the Summary of Arguments on page 7, opposing counsel states:
The Trial Court correctly determined what properties were
separate, which separate properties were contributed by each
party toward the acquisition of marital properties, but maintained
their separate character, and what marital properties were
acquired. Appellant does not dispute those findings, nor does
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she appeal from the trial court's determinations. (Emphasis
added).
Of course Margee disputes that what opposing counsel refers to as "separate properties"
maintained their separate character. The only findings and conclusions in the record make
clear that the properties in question became marital properties, and there is absolutely nothing
to indicate that they were maintained or remained as separate pre-marital properties.
According to the trial court's findings and conclusions, the separate properties at issue all
became marital properties. Ignoring that proposition is why the trial court should be reversed
for its failure to award Margee 50% of the marital properties.
7.

In the first paragraph of Argument LA. on page 8, opposing counsel states:
By complaining that the Trial Court abused its discretion in
unequally distributing the marital estate, Petitioner makes the
conceptual and misleading mistake of comparing the valuations
of the parties' pre- and post-separate estates, together with their
marital estates. This is an indirect way of complaining that the
District Court should not have held that the parties' separate
contributions remained their separate contributions, a finding
that petitioner neither objected nor appealed from. (Emphasis
added).

Such argument totally ignores the reality that Margee has compared the 50% value of the
marital estate to the pre-marital separate property which the trial court found was no longer
separate property. Again, nowhere in the record did the trial court determine that the separate
contributions "remained" separate property. That is one of the bases on which Margee has
appealed the trial court's failure to give her 50% of the marital property. In other words, even
though there was never any determination that what was originally separate property
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remained separate property, that is precisely what opposing counsel's argument erroneously
assumes. That the trial court eventually acted as though the separate property was really
separate property all along, contrary to its own findings and conclusions, is an obvious reason
why the trial court either misunderstood or misapplied the law.
8.

At the first full paragraph on page 11, opposing counsel states:
The parties and the court all agree that the gross value of
property subject to distribution as separate and marital property
in this matter consists of:
1) The Aerie home, which was sold during the divorce
proceedings, and the proceeds applied to the Little Kate
lot worth $381,000, and $263,000 placed in escrow;
2) The Park City condo worth $ 150,000; and
3) Vehicles totaling $35,600.
Total value of property to be divided: $829,600. (Emphasis added).

Here again we find the unwarranted conclusion that the property described in such paragraph
has both a "separate and marital" component. That is directly contrary to the trial court's
findings and conclusions and serves to make the point again that Margee was entitled to her
50% share of the marital property. Once it was determined to be marital property, it was no
longer separate property.
9.

In section B. on page 12, opposing counsel contends as follows:
By arguing that Margee is entitled to 50% of all property, . . .
Petitioner disregards ... that Chuck Hayes did not intend to deed
the Aerie home as joint property, or to lose the separate character
of his pre-marital contributions to that home. (App. Ad. B, R.
841-842,fflf14-16.). (Emphasis added).

Such argument again incorrectly assumes that Chuck's pre-marital contributions did not lose
their separate character when they became marital property. What Chuck intended is
741384vl
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irrelevant, because the trial court found that regardless of his intent, the Aerie home was
marital property. See footnote 1 on page 2 above.
10.

In the final paragraph of such argument at the top of page 13, opposing counsel

states:
Clearly, the Court made significant, uncontroverted findings of
separate, non-marital properties and contributions, which justify
the Court's decision in extraordinary detail. (Emphasis added).
To the contrary, with respect to the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the
Park City Condo, the trial court did not make any findings or conclusions that what had
previously been "separate, non-marital properties and contributions" did not become marital
properties.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that opposing counsel has tried to evade the reality
that the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the Park City Condo did not
remain as separate properties, that they were all marital properties, and that there were no
exceptional circumstances to justify the trial court's denial of an award to Margee of her 50%
presumed share of those properties.
Beginning with the last paragraph of page 11 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel
cites Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) in an effort to support the trial court's
error. Counsel first states that "Petitioner's methodolgy, however, has been specifically
rejected by the Court of Appeals in Hall v. Hall. . ." That is simply a misreading of Hall
since the opinion clearly affirmed the presumptive 50% rule as follows:
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In Burt v. Burt, 79 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), this court
observed that trial courts must distribute property between the
parties to a divorce in a fair, systematic fashion. The Burt court
noted that the trial court should 'first properly categorize the
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to be
entitled to all of his or her separate property and 50% of the
marital property.' The Burt court continued:
'But rather than simply enter such a decree
[automatically], the court should then consider the
existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any
be shown, proceed to effect an equitable
distribution in light of those circumstances. . . .'
Thus, under Burt, once a court makes a finding that a specific
item is marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared
equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances,
memorialized inadequate findings, require otherwise. (Citations
omitted).
At the bottom of page 11 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel next resorts to the
sentence:
Unless the parties' separate contributions are reimbursed from
the proceeds before a division of the remaining marital property,
one party would not receive his or her presumptive equal share
of marital property or his separate contribution. (Emphasis
added).
With that statement, opposing counsel has once again improperly missed the point that
the trial court here did not categorize the parties separate contributions as separate property
and that there was no "remaining" marital property. It was all marital property. This is the
crucial distinction between Hall and the case at bar, because in Hall it was determined that
the wife's contribution to the parties' home was always separate property and never became
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marital property,2 which is precisely the opposite of what happened in the present case.
Accordingly, Hall does not stand for the proposition that the trial court was required to carve
out the separate contributions before dividing the marital estate as urged by opposing counsel.
In our case, the separate contributions lost their categorization as separate property.
Finally, on the issue of the trial court's failure to honor the 50% presumption, at pages
16 and 17 of Appellee's Brief opposing counsel lists ten possibilities as to what was in the
trial court's mind. Each of the possibilities is discussed as follows:
1.

The marriage was of short duration. This argument completely ignores

the fact that in their pre-marital agreement the parties agreed that they would jointly
produce the bulk of the marital property which the trial court refused to divide equally.
The argument also overlooks the trial court's correctly stated principle of law that the
standard with respect to marriages of short duration comes into play where no children
are born of the marriage. (See Add. C, p. 12). Here, the parties knew Margee was
pregnant with Cheyanna before they married.
2.

Margee received major benefits from Chuck. Such fact was never

mentioned by the trial court as a reason why Margee was not awarded 50% of the
marital property. Furthermore, this argument completely ignores the fact that both
parties received major benefits from each other as was contemplated by the premarital agreement. While Chuck's Statement of Fact number 7 as to the pre-marital

2

See footnote 1 to the Hall opinion.
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agreement between Margee and Chuck, and his Statement of Fact number 19 as to his
contributions to the Park City Condo, infer that Margee did not discharge her part of
the agreement, any such inference is incorrect. In the Memo Decision beginning with
the last paragraph on page 15, the trial court wrote:
The court fully believes and accepts as a principle of law as well
as equity, that the work of each spouse is valuable to a marriage.
What one does almost always enables the other party to do
something else productive. Petitioner's work enabled the parties
to have benefits such as insurance, free travel, and income to
meet daily expenses. Petitioner's condo from before the
marriage enabled the parties to rent their home during the 2002
Olympics for $40,000, from which the parties bought vehicles
and used otherwise for the marriage. Both parties, and the child,
benefitted from petitioner's work. The parties took numerous
(over one hundred) airline trips, at no cost, to the Dune property
and elsewhere. Similarly, respondent's chosen field, where his
schedule is his own, enabled petitioner to work while he
remained with the child. His work enabled the parties to have a
place to go in using the free-fly benefit of petitioner's work.
(Add.C,p.l5).
3.

The parties are older and brought substantial property to the marriage.

Again, this argument ignores the parties' pre-marital agreement.
4.

The parties clearly intended that their properties remain separate.

Opposing counsel has failed to include all of what he contends the trial court
"detailed." What the trial court wrote at page 14 of the Memo Decision is "The
parties intended, and the court sofinds,that their properties remained largely separate,
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but not entirely/' (Emphasis added). (Add. C, p. 143). Accordingly, there is nothing
in that statement that identifies any exceptional circumstance with respect to what the
trial court determined was marital property, and there is no indication that this was an
exceptional circumstance relied upon.
5.

The parties kept separate accounts and no joint accounts. Surely that

fact does not constitute an exceptional circumstance to justify the trial court's failure
to equally divide over $800,000 of marital property, and there is no indication that the
trial court treated it as such.
6.

Chuck had no intention to co-mingle his separate property. This

argument is totally meaningless, because in spite of Chuck's intent with respect to comingling his assets into the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account and Kate Road, the
trial court still determined that such of Chuck's separate property became marital
property.

The fact that he did what he did with his fingers crossed is of no

consequence, and the trial court did not identify this fact as an exceptional
circumstance.
7.

Chuck had no separate retirement and his premarital savings constituted

his entire estate. This argument, apparently referring without any citation to Chuck's
pre-marital status, completely overlooks the fact that Chuck's post-divorce status
shows him to be very financially secure even if Margee is awarded 50% of the marital

3

This same language is in the conclusions at Add. B, p. 13.
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property. In any event, there is no indication in the record that the trial court
considered this an exceptional circumstance so as to justify the trial court's failure to
award Margee 50% of the marital property.
8.

The marriage was the parties' first and a occurred later in life. This

argument is really a repeat of argument number 3 above. The extraneous material
presented with respect to the possibility of Chuck having other children was never
mentioned by the trial court as a basis for any decision the trial court made, and such
certainly did not serve as an exceptional circumstance relied upon by the trial court to
justify the trial court's failure to divide the marital property equally.
9.

The Park City Condo was Margee's only Utah residence. Opposing

counsel has failed to cite any portion of the record indicating that this was a factor at
all in the trial court's decision. We fail to understand how this fact is of any
significance at all.
10.

Margee's needs were met. The same could be said of Chuck's needs.

Again, opposing counsel has failed to cite any portion of the record indicating that this
was an exceptional circumstance relied upon by the trial court.
What we are left with is that the only analysis for doing what the trial court did is the
irrational basis stated in paragraph 17 of the conclusions. Rather than repeat that argument
here, see the material beginning with the second foil paragraph on page 20 through the end
of the first paragraph on page 21 of our opening brief.
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In summary, the 50% presumption is the law in Utah. Although it is a rebuttable
presumption, it is not to be ignored cavalierly. Our law requires the existence of exceptional
circumstances to rebut the presumption. In its conclusions the trial court acknowledged the
existence of the presumption, yet nowhere does it acknowledge that the presumption can only
be rebutted by circumstances that are exceptional. Furthermore, nowhere does the trial court
provide us with any meaningful disclosure of the steps he took to reach the ultimate
conclusion that Margee was not entitled to 50% of the parties' marital properties.
Accordingly, the parties marital properties must be distributed on a 50-50 basis.
B.

The district court abused its discretion by failing to award Margee a just
and equitable share of the marital property.

Beginning with the last full paragraph on page 9 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel
argues that Chuck ended up with $200,000 less cash than when he came to the marriage,
while Margee got $9,550 more cash as a result of the court's treatment of the Park City
Condo. First it should be noted that as of the date of the marriage, Margee did not have
$60,000 cash from the sale of her Chicago condo. That sale took place after the marriage.
(App. A, f 41). It should also be noted that nowhere does opposing counsel quarrel with the
our rendering of what the trial court awarded to both Chuck and Margee as provided in the
tables on pages 18 and 19 of our opening brief. Instead, opposing counsel comes up with the
incredible statement in the first full paragraph on page 10 of Appellee's Brief that "A fair
comparison of the parties' circumstances thus reveals that Chuck's pre-marital net worth
declined by $200,000, while Margee's increased by $9,550." Such assertion is made in the
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face of the fact that the charts referred to show that by virtue of the trial court's treatment of
the parties' properties, Chuck's net worth increased by nearly $650,000 while Margee's net
worth increased by approximately $75,000. Opposing counsel's argument is proof of the old
adage that you can only cast aspersions on an argument by improperly trying to prove it.
POINT II.

EVEN USING THE "BACK OUT" METHOD OF AWARDING THE
PARTIES' ASSETS, THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE MARGEE CREDIT FOR HER
$135,000 EQUITY IN THE PARK CITY CONDO AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE, AND MARGEE SHOULD ONLY BE CHARGED WITH
HER PRO-RATA SHARE OF ANY DEFICIT IN THE MARITAL
EQUITY.

At page 13 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel argues that there is no marital estate
to divide. That is so only if Margee has no additional marital property because of the trial
court's failure to honor the 50% presumption in favor of Margee. Such failure further
resulted in an unfair result to Margee by the trial court assigning a full 50% share of the
$18,400 deficit in the marital estate as distributed by the trial court. See Point II of our
opening brief at page 26.
At the bottom of page 13 of the Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel also argues that
Margee received more than she was entitled to receive by virtue of the way the trial court
treated distribution of the Park City Condo. This is a straw-man argument because Margee
readily concedes that the Park City Condo was marital property, to be included with all other
marital property, all of which marital property was then to be divided on a 50-50 basis.
Opposing counsel's argument that somehow Margee ended up better off as a result of what
the trial court did, only makes sense if the trial court were permitted to handle the Park City
741384vl
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Condo differently and apart from all of the other marital property. The bottom chart on
page 37 of our opening brief, demonstrates that the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the
Park City Condo should all be treated as marital properties and fairly allocated with all other
marital properties, along with Margee's share of the appreciated value of the Dune Road
assets as stated in such chart. Opposing counsel's argument wants us to believe that the trial
court did Margee a favor by not treating the Park City Condo as marital property. How can
such contention be taken seriously?
Based on what is written on page 23 of the Appellee's Brief, it also appears that
opposing counsel misunderstands Margee' s position. Margee' s position is that the Park City
Condo is marital property and should be treated the same as the Marital Home, the $263,000
Account and Kate Road. However, the trial court did not recognize the 50% presumption in
favor of Margee. Margee's argument then becomes two-fold:
(1)

It was error to fail to award each of the parties their 50% portions of all of the

marital property; or
(2)

Even if one resorts to the back-out method of distribution used by the trial

court, then Margee must be given credit for her $ 135,000 contribution to the Park City Condo
to the same extent the trial court gave Chuck credit for his $55,000 contribution to the Park
City Condo, since both contributions were made to such marital property within a month of
each other.
Contrary to opposing counsel's argument on page 25 of Appellee's Brief, the trial
court valued the Park City Condo at both the date of marriage and the date of trial. What the
741384vl
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trial court did not do was give Margee credit for the full amount of her contributions to the
marital properties to the same extent that he gave Chuck credit for his contributions. We
emphasize again that Margee' s and Chuck's contributions to such marital property were made
within one month of each other.
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
AWARD MARGEE ANY SHARE OF THE APPRECIATED VALUE OF
DUNE ROAD AND ITS RENTAL INCOME.
A.

The evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding
that Margee is not the reason that Chuck did not sell all of Dune Road.

In Argument II, beginning on page 18 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel contends
that Margee is not entitled to 50% of the enhanced value of the Dune Road assets.
First, it is important to make clear that Margee does not contend she is entitled to any of the
value of Dune Road that had accrued prior to the parties' marriage.4 There is no question that
Chuck alone is entitled to that $600,000 value. However, in an effort to defeat Margee's
entitlement to 50% of the post-marriage appreciated value, opposing counsel states at the
bottom of page 19 that "Petitioner also asserts without reference to the record that Chuck
could not have built the Aerie home without selling 50% of Dune Road."
That argument completely overlooks the marshalled and controverting facts listed
beginning with the last paragraph at the bottom of page 29 and continuing through the end
of the first paragraph at the top of page 32 of our opening brief. Furthermore, opposing

4

Opposing counsel incorrectly assumes otherwise in his argument on page 12 of
Appellee's Brief.
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counsel's statement that Petitioner's assertion was "without reference" ignores the reference
to Add. D, p. 238 from the transcript of the trial proceedings wherein Chuck is recorded as
having testified as follows:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Had you not sold at least half of Dune Road, would you
have been able to build the Aerie Road property as you
did?
Absolutely not.
My question to you is your testimony different today than it was then?
Very little different. I — there might have been some other options, but
I certainly agree with that option.

Consequently, what opposing counsel characterizes as "Petitioner speculates" is fully
supported by the record.
Everyone understands that the rule with respect to separate pre-marital property is that
the court should generally award such property to the spouse bringing the property to the
marriage, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless the other spouse
has enhanced, augmented, maintained, preserved or protected such separate property. See
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1998) and Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,
1320, (Utah App. 1990).
In the face of that case law, Chuck relies heavily on the notion that in 1999 he had
options as to what he could have done with Dune Road, including borrowing against it and
selling it. However, opposing counsel fails to come to grips with Chuck's uncontro verted
admission that neither of such options was realistic, particularly in light of the fact that he
could not sell Dune Road for his asking price during the crucial time in 1999, and further in
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light of the fact that the sale of the one-half interest to Margee's mother was most
advantageous to him and his preferred option. (Add. D, pp. 235-238, 411).
Nothing opposing counsel has said defeats the proposition that by Margee convincing
her mother to buy 50% of Dune Road, Margee enabled Chuck to keep 50% of Dune Road.
Our case law says that if Margee enhanced, augmented, maintained, preserved or protected
Chuck's separate property, then Margee is entitled to a share of the enhanced value of that
property. While neither Chuck nor Margee was responsible for the post-marriage increased
value of Dune Road, Margee was responsible for the fact that Chuck got to keep his one-half
interest in Dune Road.
In an attempt to minimize Margee's contributions, at the top of page 20 of the
Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel writes:
Petitioner's sole claim appears to be based upon the fact that she
suggested her parents purchase a one-half interest in the Dune
Road property, which allowed Chuck Hayes sufficient cash
assets to complete the home in Park City, Utah and to maintain
his remaining one-half separate interest. Petitioner speculates
that had she not suggested her parents buy Chuck's one-half
interest, he could not have raised the financing necessary to
complete the Aerie home, nor would he be in a position to reap
the benefits of the substantial appreciation his one-half interest
in Dune Road experienced after the sale. (Emphasis added).
In the paragraph beginning at the bottom of the page 20, opposing counsel further writes:
The most that can be attributed to Petitioner's "suggestion" is
that a substantial benefit inured to her parents, who were
allowed to purchase a fifty percent interest in the property that
Chuck Hayes had worked on, litigated over, rebuilt and
renovated throughout a period of twenty-three years prior to the
parties' marriage. (Emphasis added).
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Nowhere in the record is there evidence that what Margee did was a mere "suggestion." To
the contrary, the trial court found that Margee encouraged such sale, and Margee's
uncontroverted testimony is that she "begged" her mother to buy the one-half interest Chuck
was willing to sell in order make good on his obligation to provide the marital home. (App.
A, 1f 44; App. D, p. 155).
In the final analysis, there is the overwhelming evidence as recited in our opening brief
that Margee was the reason that Chuck did not sell all of Dune Road, and consequently
Margee is the reason why Chuck was able to enjoy a tremendous appreciation of the value
of his retained part of Dune Road. Consequently, the trial court's finding of fact that Margee
was not the reason that Chuck did not sell all or part of any of Dune Road is simply contrary
to the evidence.
In summary, the increased value of Dune Road resulted from market forces from
which Chuck would not have been able to reap any benefit, had Margee not made it possible
for Chuck to keep his one-half interest in Dune Road.
B,

The evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding
that in the future Margee will benefit greatly from Dune Road.

In its Memo Decision, the trial court clearly relied heavily on the notion that in the
future Margee would "benefit greatly" from her mother's one-half interest in Dune Road.
The trial court later stated that what the trial court had written in the Memo Decision was not
all that determinative of its ultimate decision on that issue.
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However, nothing opposing counsel has written demonstrates that at the time of the
divorce, Margee would "benefit greatly" from Dune Road.

The evidence remains

uncontro verted that Margee would not inherit any of Dune Road. Any notion that Margee
would benefit greatly in the future because in the past Margee used Dune Road along with
Chuck and Cheyenna, surely is not sufficient to support the trial court's finding.
CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing, Margee repeats her request that the Court issue one of two
alternative orders in favor of Margee as detailed in our opening brief.
DATED this 28th day of April, 2006.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK& McDONOUGH, P.C.

By L(^~~~-~
Kent B Linebaugh

^

Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of April, 2006 I caused to be sent, via handdelivery, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
to the following:
Roger D. Sandack, Esq.
170 South Main Street
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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